Just and equitable extension
The discretion that lets an employment tribunal hear a discrimination claim brought out of time. Wider than the unfair dismissal test, but still something the claimant has to earn with a reason and a prompt response.
What does just and equitable mean for a late tribunal claim?
Section 123(1)(b) of the Equality Act 2010 lets a tribunal hear a discrimination claim brought after the primary time limit if it thinks it just and equitable to do so. It's a broad discretion: the tribunal weighs everything relevant, including why the claim was late, how late it was, whether the delay has made a fair hearing harder, and the balance of prejudice between the parties. There's no fixed list of factors and no requirement that the claimant was prevented from claiming in time.
How is it different from the unfair dismissal test?
For unfair dismissal and most other Employment Rights Act 1996 claims, section 111(2)(b) allows a late claim only where it wasn't reasonably practicable to present it in time, and then only within such further period as is reasonable. That is a much stricter test: a claimant who knew about the deadline and the right to claim will usually fail it. The just and equitable test applies to discrimination claims and is more forgiving, although it's still not automatic.
What is the primary time limit for a discrimination claim?
Six months, less one day, from the act complained of, for acts on or after 1 October 2026, under section 123(1)(a) as amended by the Employment Rights Act 2025. For acts before that date the limit was three months less one day. In both cases the period is paused by ACAS early conciliation under section 140B. Conduct extending over a period is treated as done at the end of the period.
Will the tribunal extend time if I didn't know the law?
Sometimes. Ignorance of the time limit, or of the right to claim, is a relevant factor but not a trump card. The tribunal will ask whether the ignorance was reasonable, what the claimant did once they found out, and whether the employer has been prejudiced by the delay. A claimant who acted promptly on discovering the position is in a far better place than one who waited further.
Does the tribunal start from the assumption that time shouldn't be extended?
The Court of Appeal in Robertson v Bexley Community Centre [2003] EWCA Civ 576 said time limits are exercised strictly and extension is the exception, not the rule. In Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 23 the Court of Appeal explained that this doesn't mean the discretion is weighted against claimants; it means a claimant must give a reason for the tribunal to extend, and the tribunal must weigh all the circumstances. There's no presumption either way.
What are the Keeble factors?
A checklist drawn from the Limitation Act 1980 and adopted in British Coal Corporation v Keeble [1997] IRLR 336: the length of and reasons for the delay, the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is affected, the extent to which the respondent co-operated with requests for information, how promptly the claimant acted once they knew the facts giving rise to the claim, and the steps they took to get professional help. Adedeji confirmed the list is useful but not mandatory, and that a tribunal shouldn't treat it as a rigid test.
Two tests for two kinds of claim
Employment tribunal time limits come with an escape clause, but the clause depends on the type of claim. For discrimination, harassment and victimisation under the Equality Act 2010, section 123(1)(b) allows a claim within “such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable”. For unfair dismissal, unlawful deductions, redundancy pay and most other claims under the Employment Rights Act 1996, section 111(2)(b) and its equivalents allow a late claim only where it wasn't reasonably practicable to present it in time, and then only within a further reasonable period.
The difference is large in practice. “Not reasonably practicable” asks whether the claimant could have claimed in time; if they could, the claim fails however sympathetic the reason. “Just and equitable” asks whether, taking everything into account, it's fair to let the claim proceed; a claimant who could have claimed in time may still succeed if the delay is short, explained, and has caused no real prejudice. A claim that includes both an unfair dismissal complaint and a discrimination complaint can therefore be in time for one and out of time for the other.
The primary time limit it extends
Under section 123(1)(a), as amended by the Employment Rights Act 2025, proceedings must be brought within six months starting with the date of the act complained of, for acts on or after 1 October 2026. In practice that means six months less one day. Acts wholly before that date keep the old three-month limit. ACAS early conciliation pauses the clock under section 140B. Section 123(3) provides that conduct extending over a period is treated as done at the end of the period, and that a failure to do something is treated as occurring when the person decided on it, with section 123(4) supplying a default where there's no evidence of a decision.
The six-month limit removes much of the pressure that made extension applications common, but it doesn't remove the need for them. A claimant who only discovers the discriminatory reason for a decision after the limit has passed, or who was too unwell to act, will still need the discretion.
How tribunals exercise the discretion
- 1 The claimant must give a reason. Robertson v Bexley Community Centre established that the burden is on the claimant to persuade the tribunal and that extension isn't granted as a matter of course. A tribunal can't extend time where no explanation at all is offered.
- 2 But there's no presumption against extension. In Adedeji the Court of Appeal warned against reading Robertson as creating a weighting against claimants. The tribunal simply weighs all relevant factors.
- 3 The Keeble factors are a guide. Length of and reasons for delay, effect on the cogency of evidence, the respondent's conduct, promptness once the facts were known, and steps taken to get help. Adedeji confirmed they need not be mechanically ticked off.
- 4 Prejudice is weighed both ways. The claimant loses a claim entirely if time isn't extended. The respondent may lose witnesses and documents if it is. The tribunal asks which outcome is less unjust.
- 5 Merits can be relevant. A tribunal may take account of the apparent strength of the claim, although it won't conduct a mini-trial at a preliminary hearing.
The question is usually decided at a preliminary hearing with evidence from the claimant about the delay. Medical evidence, correspondence showing when the claimant learnt the relevant facts, and a timeline of what was done and when are the materials that make or break the application.
Common reasons, and how they fare
Pursuing an internal grievance or appeal first. Not a good reason on its own; the tribunal expects a claim to be lodged in time while a grievance runs. It carries more weight where the employer encouraged the claimant to wait, or where the appeal produced new information. Ill health. A strong reason where evidence shows the claimant was unable to engage with the process, less so where they were managing other affairs at the same time. Wrong advice from a representative. Relevant, and more readily accepted under the just and equitable test than under the unfair dismissal test, where a representative's fault is usually attributed to the claimant. Discovering the discrimination late. Often the best reason of all, provided the claimant then moved quickly. Waiting for ACAS. Early conciliation already pauses the clock; delay after the certificate is issued needs its own explanation.
An employee is passed over for promotion on 10 November 2026. She is told it was on merit. On 2 June 2027 a colleague forwards an email from the decision-maker dated 8 November 2026 saying she was “too old to retrain”. She contacts ACAS on 9 June 2027 and presents her ET1 ten days after the certificate.
Primary limit (six months less one day, s.123(1)(a))
Date claimant learnt the discriminatory reason
Delay after learning the facts
The primary limit had already passed before she had any reason to suspect age discrimination. She acted within a week of discovering the email. The delay is short, the key evidence is a document that still exists, and the respondent can call the decision-maker. A tribunal applying section 123(1)(b) has every reason to extend. Had she sat on the email until the autumn, the picture would be different.
Employment tribunal time limit
ACAS early conciliation
Direct discrimination
Equality Act 2010, section 123
Employment Rights Act 1996, section 111
Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust [2021] EWCA Civ 23
Robertson v Bexley Community Centre [2003] EWCA Civ 576
Just and Equitable Extension — Employment Tribunal Glossary
What a just and equitable extension is under section 123 of the Equality Act 2010, how it differs from the unfair dismissal test, the Keeble factors, and what persuades a tribunal to hear a late discrimination claim.